reasonably powerful computers). The other focal point was MIT, with Sydney Alexander, Paul Cootner, Franco Modigliani, and Paul Samuelson. Because his coauthor, Merton Miller , was now at Chicago, Franco was a frequent visitor. Like Merton, Franco was unselfish and tireless in helping people think through research ideas. Franco and Merton (Mert to his friends and colleagues) provided an open conduit for cross-fertilization of market research at the two universities.
At the end of my second year at Chicago, it came time to write a thesis, and I went to Miller with five topics. Mert always had uncanny insight about research ideas likely to succeed. He gently stomped on four of my topics but was excited by the fifth. From my work with Harry Ernst at Tufts, I had daily data on the 30 Dow-Jones stocks. I proposed producing detailed evidence on (a) Mandelbrot's hypothesis that stock returns conform to non-normal (fat-tailed) stable distributions and (b) the time-series properties of returns. There was existing work on both topics, but I promised a unifying perspective and a leap in the amount of data brought to bear.
Vindicating Mandelbrot, my thesis (Fama 1965b) shows (in nauseating detail) that distributions of stock returns are fat-tailed: There are far more outliers than would be expected from normal distributions-a fact reconfirmed in subsequent market episodes, including the most recent. Given the accusations of ignorance on this score, recently thrown our way in the popular media, it is worth emphasizing that academics in finance have been aware of the fat-tails phenomenon in asset returns for almost 50 years.
My thesis and the earlier work of others on the time-series properties of returns fall under what came to be called tests of market efficiency. I coined the terms "market efficiency" and "efficient markets," but they do not appear in my thesis. They first appear in "Random Walks in Stock Market Prices," paper 16 in the series of Selected Papers of the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, reprinted in the Financial Analysts Journal (Fama 1965a) .
From the inception of research on the time-series properties of stock returns, economists speculated about how prices and returns behave if markets work, that is, if prices fully reflect all available information. The initial theory was the random walk model. In two important papers, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) show that the random walk prediction (price changes are independently and identically distributed) is too strong. The proposition that prices fully reflect available information implies only that prices are submartingales. Formally, the deviations of price changes or returns from the values required to compensate investors for time and risk-bearing have expected value equal to zero conditional on past information.
During the early years, in addition to my thesis, I wrote several papers on market efficiency (Fama 1963 (Fama , 1965c Fama & Blume 1966) , now mostly forgotten. My main contribution to the theory of efficient markets is my 1970 review (Fama 1970) . The paper emphasizes the joint hypothesis problem hidden in the submartingales of Mandelbrot (1966) and Samuelson (1965) . Specifically, market efficiency can only be tested in the context of an asset pricing model that specifies equilibrium expected returns. In other words, to test whether prices fully reflect available information, we must specify how the market is trying to compensate investors when it sets prices. My cleanest statement of the theory of efficient markets is in chapter 5 of Fama (1976b) , reiterated in my second review, "Efficient Markets II" (Fama 1991a) .
The joint hypothesis problem is obvious, but only on hindsight. For example, much of the early work on market efficiency focuses on the autocorrelations of stock returns. It was not recognized that market efficiency implies zero autocorrelation only if the expected returns that investors require to hold stocks are constant through time or at least serially uncorrelated, and both conditions are unlikely.
The joint hypothesis problem is generally acknowledged in work on market efficiency after Fama (1970) , and it is understood that, as a result, market efficiency per se is not testable. The flip side of the joint hypothesis problem is less often acknowledged. Specifically, almost all asset pricing models assume asset markets are efficient, so tests of these models are joint tests of the models and market efficiency. Asset pricing and market efficiency are forever joined at the hip.
EVENT STUDIES
My PhD thesis and other early work on market efficiency did not use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files, which were not yet available. When the files became available (thanks to years of painstaking work by Larry Fisher), Jim Lorie, the founder of CRSP, came to me worried that no one would use the data and CRSP would lose its funding. He suggested a paper on stock splits to advertise the data. The result is Fama et al. (1969) . This is the first study of the adjustment of stock prices to a specific kind of information event. Such event studies quickly became a research industry, vibrant to this day, and the main format for tests of market efficiency. Event studies have also found a practical application-calculating damages in legal cases.
The refereeing process for the split study was a unique experience. When more than a year passed without word from the International Economic Review, we assumed the paper would be rejected. Then a short letter arrived. The referee (Franco Modigliani) basically said, "it's great, publish it." Never again would this happen! There is a little-appreciated fact about the split paper: It contains no formal tests (standard errors, t-statistics, etc.). The results were apparently so convincing as confirmation of market efficiency that formal tests seemed irrelevant. But this was before the joint hypothesis problem was recognized, and only much later did we come to appreciate that results in event studies can be sensitive to methodology, in particular, what is assumed about equilibrium expected returns-a point emphasized in Fama (1998) .
Michael Jensen and Richard Roll are members of a once-in-a-lifetime cohort of PhD students that came to Chicago soon after I joined the faculty in 1963. Also in this rough cohort are (among others) Ray Ball, Marshall Blume, James MacBeth, Myron Scholes, and Ross Watts. I was chairman of all their thesis committees, but Merton Miller and Harry Roberts were deeply involved. Any investment in these and about 100 other PhD students I have supervised has been repaid many times by what I have learned from them during their careers.
FORECASTING REGRESSIONS
In 1975, I published a little empirical paper, "Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation" (Fama 1975 ). The topic was not new, but my approach was novel. Earlier work uses regressions of the interest rate on the inflation rate for the period covered by the interest rate. The idea is that the expected inflation rate (along with the expected real return) determines the interest rate, so the interest rate should be the dependent variable, and the expected inflation rate should be the independent variable. The observed inflation rate is, of course, a noisy proxy for its expected value, so there is a measurement error problem in the regression of the ex ante interest rate on the ex post inflation rate.
My simple insight is that a regression estimates the conditional expected value of the left-hand-side variable as a function of the right-hand-side variables. Thus, to extract the forecast of inflation in the interest rate (the expected value of inflation priced into the interest rate), one regresses the ex post inflation rate on the ex ante interest rate. On hindsight, this is the obvious way to run the forecasting regression, but again it was not obvious at the time.
There is a potential measurement error problem in the regression of the ex post inflation rate on the ex ante (T-bill) interest rate, caused by variation through time in the expected real return on the bill. The model of market equilibrium in "Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation" assumes that the expected real return is constant, and this seems to be a reasonable approximation for the 1953-1971 period of the tests. (It does not work for any later period.) This result raised a furor among Keynesian macroeconomists who postulated that the expected real return was a policy variable that played a central role in controlling investment and business cycles. There was a full-day seminar on my paper at MIT, where my simple result was heatedly attacked. I argued that I did not know what the fuss was about, given that the risk premium component of the cost of capital is surely more important than the risk-free real rate, and it seems unlikely that monetary and fiscal actions can fine-tune the risk premium. I do not remember if I won the debate, but it was followed by a tennis tournament, and I think I did win that.
The simple idea about forecasting regressions in Fama (1975) has served me well, many times. (When I have an idea, I beat it to death.) I have many papers that use the technique to extract the forecasts of future spot rates, returns, default premiums, etc., in the term structure of interests rates, for example, Fama (1976a,c; 1984b,c; 1986; 1990b; 2005) , Fama & Schwert (1979) , and Fama & Bliss (1987) . I apply the technique to study forward foreign exchange rates as predictors of future spot rates-a blatant example of intellectual arbitrage-in a paper (Fama 1984a) highly cited in that literature. The same technique is used in my work with Kenneth R. French and G. William Schwert on the predictions of stock returns in dividend yields and other variables (Fama & Schwert 1977; Fama & French 1988 , 1989 . And regressions of ex post variables on ex ante variables are now standard in forecasting studies, academic and applied.
AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS
In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling published their groundbreaking paper on agency problems in investment and financing decisions (Jensen & Meckling 1976) . According to Kim et al. (2006) , this is the second-most highly cited theory paper in economics published in the 1970-2005 period. It fathered an enormous literature.
When Mike came to present the paper at Chicago, he began by claiming it would destroy the corporate finance material in what he called the "white bible" (Fama & Miller 1972) . Mert and I replied that his analysis was deeper and more insightful, but in fact there is a discussion of stockholder-bondholder agency problems in chapter 4 of our book, another example that new ideas are almost never completely new! Spurred by Jensen & Meckling (1976) , my research took a turn into agency theory. The early papers on agency theory emphasized agency problems. I was interested in studying how competitive forces lead to the evolution of mechanisms to mitigate agency problems.
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The first paper, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (Fama 1980a) , argues that managerial labor markets, inside and outside of firms, act to control managers faced with the temptations created by diffuse residual claims that reduce the incentives of individual residual claimants to monitor managers.
I then collaborated with Mike on three papers (Fama & Jensen 1983a,b; 1985) that study more generally how different mechanisms arise to mitigate the agency problems associated with separation of ownership and control and how an organization's activities, and the special agency problems they pose, affect the nature of its residual claims and control mechanisms. For example, we argue that the redeemable residual claims of a financial mutual (e.g., an open-end mutual fund) provide strong discipline for its managers but redeemability is cost effective only when the assets of the organization can be sold quickly with low transactions costs. We also argue that the nonprofit format, in which no agents have explicit residual claims to net cash flows, is a response to the agency problem associated with activities in which there is a potential supply of donations that might be expropriated by residual claimants. Two additional papers (Fama 1990a (Fama , 1991b spell out some of the implications of Fama (1980a) and Fama & Jensen (1983a,b) for financing decisions and the nature of labor contracts. Kim et al. (2006) list the 146 papers published during 1970-2005 that have more than 500 cites in the major economics journals. I am blatantly bragging, but Fama (1980a) and Fama & Jensen (1983b) are among my six papers on the list. (The others are Fama 1970; Fama & MacBeth 1973; and French 1992, 1993 . If the list extended back to ancient times, Fama 1965b and Fama et al. 1969 would also make it.) I think of myself as an empiricist (and a simple-minded one at that), so I like my work in agency theory, as it suggests that occasionally theoretical ideas get sprinkled into the mix.
MACROECONOMICS
Toward the end of the 1970s, around the time of my agency theory research, my work took a second turn into macroeconomics and international finance. Fischer Black had similar interests, and I profited from many long discussions with him on these research areas and on other issues during the years he spent at Chicago in the office next to mine.
Because they typically assume away transactions costs, asset pricing models in finance do not have a natural role for money. Fama & Farber (1979) model a world in which financial markets are indeed frictionless, but there are transactions costs in consumption that are reduced by holding money. Money then becomes a portfolio asset, and we investigate how nominal bonds (borrowing and lending) allow consumer-investors to split decisions about how much money to hold for transactions purposes from decisions about how much of the purchasing power risk of their money holdings they will bear. We also investigate the pricing of the purchasing power risk of the money supply in the context of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Extending the analysis to an international setting, Fama & Farber (1979) show that exchange rate uncertainty is not an additional risk in international investing when purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, because PPP implies that the real return on any asset is the same to the residents of all countries. The point is obvious, on hindsight, but previous papers in the international asset pricing literature assume that exchange rate uncertainty is an additional risk, without saying anything about PPP, or saying something incorrect.
Three subsequent papers (Fama 1980b (Fama , 1983 (Fama , 1985 examine what the theory of finance says about the role of banks. The first two (Fama 1980b (Fama , 1983 argue that in the absence of reserve requirements, banks are just financial intermediaries, much like mutual funds, that manage asset portfolios on behalf of depositors. And like mutual fund holdings, the quantity of deposits has no role in price level determination (inflation). Bank deposits also provide access to an accounting system of exchange (via checks and electronic transfers) that is simply an efficient mechanism for moving claims on assets from some consumer-investors to others, without the intervention of a hand-to-hand medium of exchange like currency. Because it pays less than full interest, currency has an important role in price level determination. The role of deposits in price level determination is, however, artificial, induced by the requirement to hold reserves with the central bank that pay less than full interest and are exchangeable for currency on demand.
CORPORATE FINANCE
As finance matured, it became more specialized. Teaching and research now tend to focus entirely on asset pricing or corporate finance. This was not always so. Until several years ago, I taught both. More of my research is in asset pricing and market efficiency (66 papers and 1.5 books), but as a result of longtime exposure to Merton Miller, I have always been into corporate finance (15 papers and half of a book).
The burning issue in corporate finance in the early 1960s was whether the propositions of Modigliani & Miller (MM) (1958) and Miller & Modigliani (MM) (1961) about the value irrelevance of financing decisions hold outside the confines of their highly restrictive risk classes (where a risk class includes firms with perfectly correlated net cash flows). With the perspective provided by asset pricing models, which were unavailable to MM, it became clear that their propositions do not require their risk classes. Fama (1978) tries to provide a capstone. The paper argues that the MM propositions hold in any asset pricing model that shares the basic MM assumptions (perfect capital market, including no taxes, no transactions costs, and no information asymmetries or agency problems), as long as either (a) investors and firms have equal access to the capital market (so investors can undo the financing decisions of firms) or (b) there are perfect substitutes for the securities issued by any firm (with perfect substitute defined by whatever happens to be the right asset pricing model).
The CRSP files opened the gates for empirical asset pricing research (including work on efficient markets). Compustat similarly provides the raw material for empirical work in corporate finance. Fama & Babiak (1968) leap on the new Compustat files to test Lintner's (1956) hypothesis that firms have target dividend payouts but annual dividends only partially adjust to their targets. Lintner estimates his model on aggregate data. We examine how the model works for the individual firms whose dividend decisions it is meant to explain. It works well in our tests, and it continues to work in subsequent trials (e.g., Fama 1974) . But the speed of adjustment of dividends to their targets has slowed considerably; that is, dividends have become more sticky (Fama & French 2002) . The more interesting fact, however, is the gradual disappearance of dividends. In 1978, almost 80% of NYSEAmex-Nasdaq listed firms paid dividends, falling to about 20% in 1999 (Fama & French 2001) .
Post-MM corporate finance has two main theories: the pecking order model of Myers (1984) and Myers & Majluf (1984) and the trade-off model (which has many authors).
These theories make predictions about financing decisions when different pieces of the perfect capital markets assumption of MM do not hold. The pecking order model does reasonably well until the early 1980s, when new issues of common stock (which the model predicts are rare) become commonplace (Fama & French 2005) . There is some empirical support for the leverage targets that are the centerpiece of the trade-off model, but the speed of adjustment of leverage to its targets is so slow that the existence of targets becomes questionable. (This is the conclusion of Fama & French 2002 and other recent work.) In the end, it is not clear that the capital structure irrelevance propositions of Modigliani & Miller are less realistic as rough approximations than the popular alternatives. (This is the conclusion of Fama & French 2002.) In my view, the big open challenge in corporate finance is to produce evidence on how taxes affect market values and thus optimal financing decisions. Modigliani & Miller (1963) suggest that debt has large tax benefits, and taxation disadvantages dividends. To this day, this is the position commonly advanced in corporate finance courses. Miller (1977) , however, presents a scenario in which the tax benefits of debt due to the tax deductibility of interest payments at the corporate level are offset by taxation of interest receipts at the personal level, and leverage has no effect on a firm's market value. Miller & Scholes (1978) present a scenario in which dividend and debt choices have no effect on the market values of firms. Miller (1977) and Miller & Scholes (1978) recognize that there are scenarios in which taxes do affect optimal dividend and debt decisions. In the end, the challenge is empirical measurement of tax effects (the marginal tax rates implicit) in the pricing of dividends and interest. So far, the challenge goes unmet. Fama & French (1998a) take a crack at this first-order issue, without success. The problem is that dividend and debt decisions are related to expected net cash flows-the main determinant of the market value of a firm's securities. Because proxies for expected net cash flows are far from perfect, the cross-section regressions of Fama & French (1998a) do not produce clean estimates of how the taxation of dividends and interest affects the market values of a firm's stocks and bonds. There are also papers that just assume debt has tax benefits that can be measured from tax rate schedules. Without evidence on the tax effects in the pricing of interest, such exercises are empty.
THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
Without being there, one cannot imagine what finance was like before formal asset pricing models. For example, at Chicago and elsewhere, investments courses were about security analysis: how to pick undervalued stocks. In 1963, I taught the first course at Chicago devoted to Markowitz's (1959) portfolio model and its famous offspring, the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) .
The CAPM provides the first precise definition of risk and how it drives expected return, until then vague and sloppy concepts. The absence of formal models of risk and expected return placed serious limitations on research that even grazed the topic. For example, the pathbreaking paper of Modigliani & Miller (1958) uses arbitrage within risk classes to show that (given their assumptions) financing decisions do not affect a firm's market value. They define a risk class as firms with perfectly correlated net cash flows. This is restrictive, and it led to years of bickering about the applicability of their analysis and conclusions. The problem was due to the absence of formal asset pricing models that define risk and how it relates to expected return.
The arrival of the CAPM was like the air clearing after a thunderstorm. Extensions soon appeared, but the quantum leaps were the intertemporal model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973a) , which generalizes the CAPM to a multiperiod world with possibly multiple dimensions of risk, and the consumption CAPM of Lucas (1978) , Breeden (1979) , and others.
Though not about risk and expected return, any history of the excitement in finance in the 1960s and 1970s must mention the options pricing work of Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973b) . These are the most successful papers in economics-ever-in terms of academic and applied impact. Every PhD student in economics is exposed to this work, and the papers are the foundation of a massive industry in financial derivatives.
There are many early tests of the CAPM, but the main survivors are Black et al. (1972) and Fama & MacBeth (1973) . Prior to these papers, the typical test of the CAPM was a cross-section regression of the average returns on a set of assets on estimates of their market bs and other variables. (The CAPM predicts, of course, that the b premium is positive, and b suffices to describe the cross section of expected asset returns.) Black et al. were suspicious that the slopes in these cross-section regressions seemed too precise (the reported standard errors seemed too small). They guessed rightly that the problem was the ordinary least squares assumption that there is no cross-correlation in the regression residuals. Fama & MacBeth (1973) provide a simple solution to the cross-correlation problem. Instead of a regression of average asset returns on their bs and other variables, one does the regression month by month. The slopes are then monthly portfolio returns whose average values can be used to test the CAPM predictions that the b premium is positive and other variables add nothing to the explanation of the cross section of expected returns. (The point is explained best in chapter 8 of Fama 1976b .) The month-by-month variation in the regression slopes captures all effects of the cross-correlation of the regression residuals, and these effects are automatically embedded in the time-series standard errors of the average slopes. The approach thus captures residual covariances without requiring an estimate of the residual covariance matrix.
The Fama-MacBeth approach is standard in tests of asset pricing models that use crosssection regressions, but the benefits of the approach carry over to panels (time series of cross sections) of all sorts. Kenneth French and I emphasize this point (advertise is more accurate) in our corporate finance empirical work (e.g., Fama & French 1998a , 2002 . Outside of finance, research in economics that uses panel regressions has only recently begun to acknowledge that residual covariance is a pervasive problem. Various new robust regression techniques are available, but the Fama-MacBeth approach remains a simple option.
Given the way my recent empirical work with Kenneth French dumps on the CAPM, it is only fair to acknowledge that the CAPM rightly deserves a lot of credit for forcing money managers to take more seriously the challenges posed by the work on efficient markets. Before the CAPM, money management was entirely active, and performance reporting was shoddy. The CAPM gave us a clear story about risk and expected return (i.e., a model of market equilibrium) that allowed us to judge the performance of active managers. Using the CAPM, Jensen (1968) rang the bell on the mutual fund industry. Performance evaluation via the CAPM quickly became standard among both academics and practitioners, passive management got a foothold, and active managers became aware that their feet would forever be put to the fire.
THE THREE-FACTOR MODEL
The evidence in Black et al. (1972) and Fama & MacBeth (1973) is generally favorable to the CAPM, or at least to Black's (1972) version. Subsequently, violations of the model, labeled anomalies, begin to surface. Banz (1981) finds that b does not fully explain the higher average returns of small (low market capitalization) stocks. Basu (1977 Basu ( , 1983 finds that the positive relation between the earning-price ratio (E/P) and average return is left unexplained by market b. Rosenberg et al. (1985) find a positive relation between average stock return and the book-to-market ratio (B/M) that is missed by the CAPM. Bhandari (1988) documents a similar result for market leverage [the ratio of debt to the market value of equity (D/M)]. Ball (1978) and Keim (1988) argue that variables such as size, E/P, B/M, and D/M are natural candidates to expose the failures of asset pricing models as explanations of expected returns, because all these variables use the stock price, which, given expected dividends, is inversely related to the expected stock return.
The individual papers on CAPM anomalies did not seem to threaten the dominance of the model. My guess is that viewed one at a time, the anomalies seemed like curiosity items that showed that the CAPM was just a model, an approximation that could not be expected to explain the entire cross section of expected stock returns. I see no other way to explain the impact of Fama & French (1992) , "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," which contains nothing new. The CAPM anomalies in the paper are those listed above, and the evidence that there is no reliable relation between average return and market b was available in Reinganum (1981) and Lakonishok & Shapiro (1986) . Apparently, seeing all the negative evidence in one place led readers to accept our conclusion that the CAPM just does not work. The model is an elegantly simple and intuitively appealing tour de force that laid the foundations of asset pricing theory, but its major predictions seem to be violated systematically in the data.
An asset pricing model can only be dethroned by a model that provides a better description of average returns. The three-factor model (Fama & French 1993) is our shot at such a model. The model proposes that along with market b, sensitivities to returns on two additional portfolios, small minus big (SMB) and high minus low (HML), explain the cross section of expected stock returns. The size factor, SMB, is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small and big stocks, and the value/growth factor, HML, is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low B/M (i.e., value and growth) stocks. The SMB and HML returns are, of course, brute force constructs designed to capture the patterns in average returns related to size and value versus growth stocks that are left unexplained by the CAPM.
Kenneth French and I have many papers that address questions about the three-factor model and the size and value/growth patterns in average returns the model is meant to explain. For example, to examine whether the size and value/growth patterns in average returns observed by Fama & French (1992) for the post-1962 period are the chance result of data dredging, Davis et al. (2000) extend the tests back to 1927, and Fama & French (1998b) examine international data. The results are similar to those in Fama & French (1992) . Fama & French (1996 , 2008 examine whether the three-factor model can explain the anomalies that cause problems for the CAPM. The three-factor model does well on the anomalies associated with variants of price ratios; however, it is just a model, and it fails to absorb some other anomalies. The most prominent is the momentum in short-term returns documented by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) , which is a problem for all asset pricing models that do not add exposure to momentum as an explanatory factor. After 1993, both academic and applied works directed at measuring the performance of managed portfolios routinely use the benchmarks provided by the three-factor model, which is often augmented with a momentum factor (e.g., Carhart 1997 and, more recently, Kosowski et al. 2006 or Fama & French 2010 .
From its beginnings, there has been controversy about how to interpret the size and especially the value/growth premiums in average returns captured by the three-factor model. Fama & French (1993 , 1996 propose a multifactor version of Merton's (1973a) ICAPM. The weakness of this position is the question it leaves open: What are the state variables that drive the size and value premiums, and why do they lead to variation in expected returns missed by market b? There is a literature that proposes answers to this question, but in my view the evidence so far is unconvincing.
The chief competitor to our ICAPM risk story for the value premium is the overreaction hypothesis of DeBondt & Thaler (1987) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) . They postulate that market prices overreact to the recent good times of growth stocks and the bad times of value stocks. Subsequent price corrections then produce the value premium (high average returns of value stocks relative to growth stocks). The weakness of this position is the presumption that investors never learn about their behavioral biases, which is necessary to explain the persistence of the value premium.
Asset pricing theory typically assumes that portfolio decisions depend only on the properties of the return distributions of assets and portfolios. Another possibility, suggested by Fama & French (2007) and related to the stories in Daniel & Titman (1997) and Barberis & Shleifer (2003) , is that tastes for other characteristics of assets, unrelated to properties of returns, also play a role. (Socially responsible investing is an example.) Perhaps many investors simply get utility from holding growth stocks, which tend to be profitable fast-growing firms, and they are averse to value stocks, which tend to be relatively unprofitable with few growth opportunities. If such tastes persist, they can have persistent effects on asset prices and expected returns, as long as they do not lead to arbitrage opportunities.
To what extent is the value premium in expected stock returns due to ICAPM state variable risks, investor overreaction, or tastes for assets as consumption goods? We may never know. Moreover, given the blatant empirical motivation of the three-factor model (and the four-factor offspring of Carhart 1997), perhaps we should just view the model as an attempt to find a set of portfolios that span the mean-variance-efficient set and, as such, can be used to describe expected returns on all assets and portfolios (Huberman & Kandel 1987) .
The academic research on the size and value premiums in average stock returns has transformed the investment management industry, on both the supply side and on the demand side. Whatever their views about the origins of the premiums, institutional investors commonly frame their asset allocation decisions in two dimensions, size and value versus growth, and the portfolio menus offered by money managers are typically framed in the same way. It is testimony to the credibility of research in finance that all this happened in a very short period of time.
CONCLUSIONS
The first 50 years of research in finance has been a great ride. I am confident finance will continue to be a great ride into the indefinite future.
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ADDENDUM: PROVIDED BY THE TENURED FINANCE FACULTY OF CHICAGO BOOTH
When my review was posted on the forum of the Web site of the Chicago Booth Initiative on Global Markets, the tenured finance faculty introduced it with the following comments.
E.F.F.
This post makes available an autobiographical note by Gene Fama that was commissioned by the Annual Review of Financial Economics. Gene's remarkable career and vision, to say nothing of his engaging writing style, make this short piece a must read for anyone interested in finance. However, as his colleagues, we believe his modesty led him to omit three crucial aspects of his contributions.
First, Gene was (and still is) essential to shaping the nature of the finance group at Chicago. As he explains in a somewhat understated fashion, he and Merton Miller transformed the finance group, turning it into a research-oriented unit. For the past 47 years, he has held court on Tuesday afternoons in the finance workshop, in a room that now bears his name. Through the workshop, generations of students, colleagues, and visitors have been and continue to be exposed to his research style of developing and rigorously testing theories with real-world data that has become the hallmark of Chicago finance.
Second, and equally important, is his leadership. Rather than rest on his laurels or impose his own views on the group, Gene has always sought the truth, even when it appeared at odds with his own views. He has promoted a contest of ideas and outlooks, all subject to his exceptional standards of quality. The makeup of the group has shifted as the world and what we know about it has changed. The current finance group at Chicago includes a diverse set of people who specialize in all areas of modern finance, including behavioral economics; pure theory; and emerging, nontraditional areas such as entrepreneurship and development that were unheard of when Gene arrived at Chicago. Contrary to the caricatured descriptions, there is no single Chicago view of finance, except that the path to truth comes from the rigorous development and confrontation of theories with data.
Finally, each of us has our own personal examples of Gene's generosity, kindness, and mentorship. He is an impeccable role model. He is in his office every day, and his door is always open. By personal example, he sets the standards for the values and ethics by which we do research and run our school. All of us have learned enormously from Gene's generous willingness to discuss his and our work, and gently and patiently to explain and debate that work with generations of faculty. Gene likely enjoys as high a ranking in the "thanks for comments" footnotes of published papers as he does in citations. He has made
